Whereas adults largely base their evaluations of others' actions on others' intentions, a host of research in developmental psychology suggests that younger children privilege outcome over intention, leading them to condemn accidental harm. To date, this question has been examined only with children capable of language production. In the current studies, we utilized a non-linguistic puppet show paradigm to examine the evaluation of intentional and accidental acts of helping or harming in 10-month-old infants. In Experiment 1 (n = 64), infants preferred intentional over accidental helpers but accidental over intentional harmers, suggestive that by this age infants incorporate information about others' intentions into their social evaluations. In Experiment 2 (n = 64), infants did not distinguish ''negligently" accidental from intentional helpers or harmers, suggestive that infants may find negligent accidents somewhat intentional. In Experiment 3 (n = 64), we found that infants preferred truly accidental over negligently accidental harmers, but did not reliably distinguish negligently accidental from truly accidental helpers, consistent with past work with adults and children suggestive that humans are particularly sensitive to negligently accidental harm. Together, these results imply that infants engage in intention-based social evaluation of those who help and harm accidentally, so long as those accidents do not stem from negligence.
Introduction
Who is more blameworthy: Chris, who intentionally poisoned and killed his mother, or Ben, who unknowingly gave his mother poison, accidentally killing her? Beginning with Piaget (1965 Piaget ( /1932 , a host of research in developmental psychology suggests that how individuals judge intentional versus accidental acts changes with age: Whereas adults assign praise and blame based primarily on mental states like possessing helpful or harmful intent (often referred to as making the ''intention-outcome distinction; " Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Moran et al., 2011; Ohtsubo, 2007) , children under age 4 adhere primarily to an outcome rule; for example condemning acts with harmful outcomes even if harm was unintended (Baird & Astington, 2004; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Margoni & Surian, 2016; Margoni & Surian, 2017; Shultz, Wright, & Schleifer, 1986; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) . Although research suggests that reducing processing demands improves children's ability to incorporate mental states into explicit moral judgments (Armsby, 1971; Farnill, 1974; Yuill & Perner, 1988) , even with these reduced demands there remains significant evidence that the ability to incorporate mental states into moral judgments improves with age. This developmental shift has been taken to suggest either that moral judgments undergo fundamental conceptual change over development (Cushman et al., 2013; Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965 Piaget, /1932 , or that changes in non-moral domains like theory of mind and executive function are critical for privileging intention over outcome in moral judgment (Chandler, Sokol, & Hallett, 2001; Grueneich, 1982; Killen, Lynn Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Zelazo et al., 1996; see Margoni & Surian, 2016) .
Past research into the development of the intention-outcome distinction has largely utilized explicit verbal measures to explore children's third-party moral judgments (cf. Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) . Critically, these measures constrain research to children who are capable of language production. To address this constraint, researchers have begun to utilize non-linguistic ''puppet shows," in which animated puppet agents perform simple helpful and harmful actions toward third-parties while preverbal infants and toddlers look on; relative preference for the helpful versus harmful puppets is subsequently determined based on which puppets infants and toddlers look at, reach toward, or give http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.029 0010-0277/Ó 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
